Rule of Law and Legislation

Which legal and institutional reforms are enacted, pending or inherited from the previous government?

The new government inherits a dense legal baseline created in 2024-2025: constitutional and cardinal-law changes to judicial appointments, retirement and court functioning, many criticized for weak consultation and unresolved independence concerns. As of January 2026, civil-society evidence said no systemic steps had addressed the European Commission’s 2025 judiciary recommendations. The April 2026 CJEU judgment in Commission v Hungary adds a major EU-law pressure point on LGBTI+ restrictions.

Inherited constitutional and judicial reforms are already enacted

The previous legislature enacted the Fourteenth Amendment and related laws changing judicial appointments, including raising the lower age limit for judges from 30 to 35 and adding outside-practice requirements. A June 2025 justice omnibus affected 28 laws and included rules on judges and prosecutors serving until age 70, Kúria case-law uniformity, online presence at hearings, reasoned decisions in some civil cases, and daily lump-sum compensation for procedural delays.

Evidence claims (4)
  • claim 313: In December 2024, the Parliament adopted the 14th Amendment to the Fundamental Law and Act LXXIV of 2024, which amended several cardinal laws governing the appointment and selection of judges. source
  • claim 65: The Fourteenth Amendment to the Fundamental Law and other legislative amendments changed the rules on judicial appointments, raising the lower age limit for becoming a judge from 30 to 35 years as of 1 March 2025 and introducing new requirements of prior experience outside the judiciary for first-time appointments. source
  • claim 319: On 11 June 2025, the Parliament adopted Act XLIX of 2025 on the Amendment of Justice-related Laws, a broad judicial reform affecting 28 laws, including provisions on how a judge can continue to serve after the general retirement age. source
  • claim 64: The new law introduced rules related to the functioning of the justice system, including detailed rules on the possibility for judges and prosecutors to serve until the age of 70, the Kúria’s role in securing the uniformity of case law, the possibility of online presence during hearings for members of the audience, the possibility not to hand down reasoned judicial decisions in civil cases if it is presumed that the parties will not exercise their right of appeal, and the obligation of the courts to pay parties a daily lump sum for breaches of procedural deadlines. source

Consultation and lawmaking defects are a major inherited issue

Civil-society evidence says the June 2025 judicial reform was not preceded by meaningful professional or public consultation. The Ministry of Justice gave the National Judicial Council a short deadline on a lengthy draft and opened public consultation immediately before a holiday period. The National Judicial Council challenged the process but the Constitutional Court rejected its complaint.

Evidence claims (4)
  • claim 320: The 11 June 2025 judicial reform was not preceded by meaningful professional or public consultation. source
  • claim 321: The Ministry of Justice sent the 75-page draft to the National Judicial Council on 4 April 2025 with a deadline of just seven days, and the Ministry only later allowed a last-minute prolongation. source
  • claim 323: The Ministry of Justice published the draft bill on 17 April 2025 and provided the statutory minimum of eight days for public consultation, which in practice meant only four working days. source
  • claim 322: The National Judicial Council filed a complaint to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the consultation process amounted to a de facto violation of its right to be consulted, but the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint in Decision 8/2025. (IX. 25.) AB. source

Judicial-independence deficiencies remain unresolved

As of 16 January 2026, the supplied civil-society report says the government and Parliament had taken no systemic steps to address the European Commission’s 2025 judiciary recommendations. The unresolved issues include lower-court case allocation, judicial remuneration, transfer and secondment safeguards, and opaque administrative decisions by senior court officials.

Evidence claims (5)
  • claim 306: Until the cut-off date of the present contribution (16 January 2026) no steps have been taken by the Hungarian government and the Parliament to systemically address the recommendations formulated by the European Commission with respect to the independence of the judiciary in the 2025 Rule of Law Report. source
  • claim 68: The transparency of case allocation in lower courts has not been improved, whereas the case allocation in the Kúria is being implemented well. source
  • claim 312: No structural measures have been taken to safeguard the increase of the remuneration of judges, prosecutors, and judicial and prosecutorial staff in line with European standards, and judges and prosecutors remain to be "at the mercy" of the other branches of power when it comes to their salaries. source
  • claim 327: The legislation on transfers still lacks fundamental guarantees for the irremovability of judges in certain areas. source
  • claim 329: The legislation lacks objective criteria for secondments, including when the legal conditions are met, the receiving court, the selection of the seconded judge, and the term of the secondment. source

EU-law litigation over LGBTI+ restrictions is a live reform driver

On 21 April 2026, the Court of Justice delivered judgment in Commission v Hungary. The case concerned whether a member state may prohibit or restrict access to LGBTI+ content on child-protection grounds, and the Commission argued Hungary’s law stigmatized and marginalized LGBTI+ people and violated EU law, fundamental rights and Article 2 values.

Evidence claims (3)
  • claim 1: On 21 April 2026, the Court of Justice, sitting as a full court, delivered its judgment in case C-769/22 Commission v Hungary. source
  • claim 86: The case examined whether a member state may prohibit or restrict access to LMBTI+ content on the grounds of protecting children. source
  • claim 89: The European Commission brought infringement proceedings against Hungary, alleging that the law stigmatizes and marginalizes LMBTI+ persons and violates EU law, including internal market rules, fundamental rights, and Article 2 values of the Treaty on European Union. source

Analysis

Evidence: enacted reforms are documented by European Commission and civil-society sources, while the CJEU evidence establishes a concrete EU-law judgment. Inference: the new government’s rule-of-law workload is not merely prospective; it must decide whether to repeal, amend or defend inherited judicial and rights-related laws. This inference is based on claims 313, 65, 319 and 64 showing enacted laws, and claims 306, 68, 312, 327 and 329 showing unresolved deficiencies. Contested-source distinction: EU/legal sources describe formal law and litigation; civil-society sources emphasize defective consultation and independence risks; no official post-transition Hungarian legal reform package is supplied.

Evidence Gaps

  • No supplied evidence shows which judicial or rights-related laws the new government has actually repealed or amended after taking office.
  • No supplied evidence gives the operative holdings or remedies of the CJEU judgment beyond the subject and Commission arguments.
  • No supplied evidence provides the new government’s legislative calendar.